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Abstract
This article draws upon co-author Masashi Yui’s unique database 
on state sector organisational restructuring in New Zealand from 
1960 to 2017. It shows that if the peak years of structural change, 
1986–92 – the ‘revolution’ which saw New Zealand as a world leader 
in what became known as New Public Management – were seismic 
shocks, then they have been followed by an apparently endless 
number of aftershocks, which distinguish the post-peak period from 
the 25 years preceding it. The article speculates as to whether there 
could be links between the amount of organisational restructuring, 
unsatisfactory productivity rates in the New Zealand state sector, and 
the embedding of the ‘managerialist’ culture that was introduced by 
the ‘revolution’. 
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organisational restructuring  
in the New Zealand  
state sector, 1960–2017 T
hirty years ago New Zealand’s State 
Sector Act 1988 transformed the 
country’s central governmental 
system into what was widely seen at the 
time as an exemplar of public management 
reform, a poster child for what soon 
became known as New Public Management 
(Boston et al., 1996).1 These changes 
involved, inter alia, a massive restructuring 
of the country’s machinery of government, 
and were accompanied by the adoption 
of ‘managerialist’ practices in an effort to 
make the state sector more like corporate 
business in how this machinery was run. 
We do not discuss the pros and cons of 
these radical changes, but instead draw 
upon a unique body of empirical research 
conducted by co-author Masashi Yui for his 
as yet uncompleted PhD in public policy 
at the School of Government, Victoria 
University of Wellington, documenting all 
cases of organisational restructuring in the 
country’s state sector between 1960 and 
2017. This research enables comparisons 
to be made for the first time between the 
amount of restructuring that occurred in 
the New Zealand state sector in the nearly 
three decades before the ‘revolution’ of the 
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late 1980s and early 90s, and in the 30 years 
since then.2  
Governmental restructuring
The radical structural changes that were 
implemented mainly in the period 1986–
1992 were dramatic events in the history of 
New Zealand governmental administration. 
To use a seismic analogy, these massive 
quakes have been followed over the past 
30 years by a whole host of aftershocks, 
successive and seemingly endless cases of 
organisational restructuring, which have 
left the governmental ecosystem fluid and 
relatively unstable. Such restructuring has 
been much more likely to occur in the 
decades after the ‘revolution’ than it did in 
the decades preceding it. Ironically, while 
the advent of MMP – mixed-member 
proportional representation – in the mid-
1990s has not brought with it increased 
political instability, as many of its opponents 
had predicted would happen; instead 
instability has become a central feature of 
the governmental bureaucracy. This article 
provides data to substantiate this claim.  
Research methods
Structural reorganisations are machinery of 
government changes carried out to achieve 
policy goals and solve perceived problems 
with the way government bureaucracy 
functions. For this study, structural 
reorganisations are organisational changes 
that affected the number and configuration 
of distinct state sector organisations 
(ministries/departments, Crown entities 
and state-owned enterprises).3 Internal 
restructurings that occurred solely within 
each organisation are beyond the scope 
of this study.4 Therefore, the unit of 
analysis in this study is individual cases of 
restructuring, such as the creation of new 
government organisations, the abolition 
of existing organisations, the transfer of 
functions between organisations, and the 
change of organisations’ names. These 
changes were made through replacement, 
merger, splitting, absorption, take-over of 
responsibilities, rebranding, and so forth. 
This study uses an empirical method to 
further understand the transformation of 
the state sector that occurred between 1986 
and 1992, by comparing the amount of 
central government organisational 
restructuring that occurred in the decades 
both before and after this time; that is, in 
the 57 years from 1960 to 2017. The data 
generated covers structural reorganisations 
that have taken place in departments/
ministries, Crown entities/agencies and 
state-owned enterprises. The data is 
presented here in graphs, which help to 
identify trajectories over time and any 
patterns of structural reorganisation.  
All New Zealand governmental 
organisations that have existed over the 
past nearly 60 years have been included in 
this study, a total of 327.5 The study first 
identified 457 structural reorganisations6 
at the levels of departments/ministries, 
non-departmental bodies, Crown entities/
agencies and state-owned enterprises (or 
SOEs), all of which were carried out 
between 1960 and 2017. Departments/
ministries include public service 
departments as well as non-public service 
departments, such as the New Zealand 
Defence Force and the Police, which are 
not bound by the State Sector Act 1988. 
Crown entities/agencies are government-
controlled entities specified as such first by 
the Public Finance Act 1989 and later by 
the Crown Entities Act 2004. State-owned 
enterprises, such as New Zealand Post Ltd 
and the Transpower New Zealand Ltd, are 
essentially government-owned companies 
created by the State-Owned Enterprises Act 
1986. Non-departmental bodies are not a 
legally constituted group of state service 
organisations, but for this study this 
categorisation was applied to non-
departmental government organisations 
existing until the mid-1980s and early 
1990s, which were predecessors of Crown 
entities/agencies or state-owned enterprises 
that are now legally constituted forms and 
collectively governed by respective laws. 
This study classified them into this category 
if they were either body corporates that 
were established under specific statutory 
acts, and for which the government had 
power to nominate a majority of governing 
board members, or corporations/
companies whose shares were totally held 
by the government. These corporations/
companies were listed in the annual reports 
of the controller and auditor-general, as 
required by section 79 of the Public 
Revenues Act 1953. 
In New Zealand there is no single 
source of ready data that can be used to 
provide a comprehensive picture of 
machinery of government changes over a 
long period of time and in chronological 
order. Therefore, this study collected data 
on structural reorganisations from a 
variety of sources. The primary source was 
the Archway agency list organised by 
Archives New Zealand, and based on public 
records transferred from organisational 
entities which have engaged in record-
keeping activities from 1840 to the present 
day. In Archway the entities are called 
‘agencies’, and there are currently 5,337 
agencies documented in the system. 
Archway contains descriptive information 
on government organisations, including 
the functions they performed. For this 
study’s purposes, Archway is useful because 
information on structural organisational 
changes carried out to date can be obtained 
by tracing changes of locations of records. 
This enables the researcher to identify 
administrative changes (creation, 
disestablishment, merger, name change, 
transfer of functions between departments, 
etc.) and also predecessor/successor and 
superior/subordinate relationships. The 
information provided through Archway 
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was cross-checked with relevant statutes, 
including the State Services Acts of 1962 
and 1988, the Crown Entities Act 2004, the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the 
Public Finance Act 1989, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962, 
the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and the Official 
Information Act 1982, where equivalent 
information is available as statutory 
amendments. Additional sources used for 
this study were Statistics New Zealand’s 
New Zealand Official Yearbook (1957–2012), 
the State Services Commission’s and the 
Ministry of Justice’s Directory of Official 
Information (1983–87; 1988–2017) and the 
State Services Commission’s annual reports 
to Parliament (1955–2017). Also, the 
annual reports to Parliament of government 
departments and agencies published in the 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives, and the New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates were consulted 
when sufficient and reliable information 
was not readily obtained from the other 
materials. In addition, this study has made 
extensive use of government press releases 
available at the official website of the New 
Zealand government (www.beehive.govt.
nz). 
Research findings
How much restructuring?
Figure 1 shows that from 1960 through 
to 2017 the number of government 
departments and ministries declined 
gradually, except for a spike in the late 
1980s. In 1960 there were a total of 44 
such departments; by 2017 the number 
had come down to 33. During the term of 
the fourth Labour government, 1984–90, 
the deputy prime minister (later prime 
minister), Geoffrey Palmer, engaged 
on what he termed a ‘quango hunt’ to 
reduce the number of arm’s-length 
bodies. As Figure 1 shows, this hunt was 
not particularly fruitful, as ‘traditional’ 
quangos (here termed non-departmental 
bodies, or NDBs) continued to increase 
in number (apart from a short-lived 
reduction under Prime Minister Robert 
Muldoon’s government), and from the late 
1980s there was a huge and rapid increase 
in the number of Crown entities (as they 
became called), resulting from the hiving-
off of functions from large conglomerate 
departments.7 State-owned enterprises, 
Figure 2: State services restructuring cases, 1960-2017
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Figure 1: Trends in New Zealand state services, 1960–2017
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first established in the mid-1980s, have 
declined only marginally in number.
In Figure 2 one gains a graphic picture 
of the number of individual cases of 
restructuring carried out between 1960 
and 2017. It is clear that in the 30 years 
since the radical changes of the late 1980s 
and early 90s there have been far more 
cases of restructuring than in the preceding 
two decades. Removing these years from 
the count shows that between 1993 and 
2017 there were a total of 198 
reorganisations, compared to a total of 90 
between 1960 and 1985; that is, an increase 
of more than double. The big quake 
continues to be followed by frequent, 
though usually smaller, aftershocks.      
Which types of organisations were 
restructured?
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, departments/
ministries have been the main target 
of restructuring, while reorganisations 
among Crown entities were regular 
occurrences from the time of their 
inception in the late 1980s through to the 
late 1990s. Reorganisations among SOEs 
have been much less frequent, though 
there have been a considerable number of 
reorganisations involving a mixture of one 
or more of the three categories since the 
late 1980s. Much of this reflects changes 
in the legal form of various organisations, 
from being departments or ministries to 
becoming Crown entities or SOEs.
During the peak years (of radical 
restructuring), 1987–89, as indicated in 
Figure 5 a high proportion of departments/
ministries were subjected to restructuring 
– about 42% of them on average. This was 
matched only in 2011, when 41% of 
departments and ministries were involved. 
As Figure 5 shows, in the years before the 
fourth Labour government pursued radical 
change, the proportion of departments and 
ministries subject to change had been much 
lower, with peaks of 28% in 1972 and 25% 
in 1978, compared with an average of just 
over three reorganisations per year from 
1960 to 1985. From 1993 to 2017 there was 
an average of nearly seven per year. 
What types of restructuring?
Figure 6 shows the fragmentation of larger 
departments and ministries that occurred 
during the peak years, 1987–92, reflecting 
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Figure 4: Form of restructuring, single groups (department, NDB, CE, or SOE) vs. mixed
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Figure 5: Departments affected by restructuring, 1960-2017
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the separation of many ministries from 
their operational arms, the hiving-off of 
a plethora of departmental functions to 
single-purpose Crown agencies, and the 
privatisation of state-owned assets. The 
figure also shows that since 1998, and 
especially in the earlier years of the Labour-
led governments from 1999 to 2004, and 
then under the National-led government 
of 2010–12, there were prominent moves 
towards more ‘joined-up’ government, 
especially as many departments and 
ministries were reconnected to their 
operational arms.
There were 24 cases of name change for 
departments/ministries8 during the whole 
period. Seven such changes were made 
during the 28 years before the introduction 
of the State Sector Act 1988, and 17 have 
been made since then (i.e. up to 2017). 
Name changes were most common under 
both the Clark and Key governments, each 
with five cases.
Which organisations were more and which 
less likely to be restructured?
There are variations in changeability of 
government organisations over time. 
When classified by policy area, far fewer 
reorganisations were found in the areas of 
defence, finance and foreign affairs, and in 
the legislative and Cabinet offices. On the 
other hand, policy areas that are strongly 
connected with people’s interests were 
most likely to see restructuring – examples 
are business and economy, welfare, 
and communities and social groups. 
Communities and social groups are the 
policy area of those departments/agencies 
that deal with interests of particular 
clients: women, Mäori, Pasifika, seniors, 
youth, people with disabilities, and so on. 
More restructuring in sectors targeted 
at these particular groups of population 
is mostly explained by differences in the 
way of delivering public services to them 
– i.e. through a stand-alone organisation 
or a larger department responsible for a 
wider range of functions. Figure 7 shows 
the number of reorganisations in sectors 
that were most susceptible to restructuring, 
and how the focus of restructuring has 
changed among sectors over the past 60 
years. The business and economy sector 
was commonly found across time, whereas 
welfare and communities and social groups 
have become the main focus since the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Restructuring in the 
energy, information and communication, 
and transport sectors was largely a result 
of corporatisation (and subsequently 
privatisation) and departmental functions 
being transferred to agencies.
Which governments did the most 
restructuring?
During the years 1960–2017, National 
or National-led governments held office 
for 68% of the time and initiated 58% 
of all the restructurings, while Labour 
or Labour-led governments, in office for 
32% of the duration, instigated 42% of 
the changes. So, proportionate to the time 
in office, significantly more restructuring 
was carried out by Labour or Labour-
led governments than was conducted 
by National or National-led ones. This 
may not be surprising in view of the fact 
that it was a Labour government that 
was responsible for the peak years of 
restructuring. When those years, 1986–92, 
are set aside, the data shows that National 
or National-led governments, which held 
office for 37 of the remaining 51 years – 
that is, 73% of the time – conducted 62% 
of the reorganisations. Labour or Labour-
led governments were responsible for 38% 
of the changes, over only 12 years, or 24% 
Figure 7: Focus of reorganisations among most changeable sectors, 1960-2017
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of the period. Proportionately, therefore, 
Labour or Labour-led governments 
were, overall, markedly more inclined to 
restructure than were their main political 
opponents.
As Figure 8 shows, the Labour-led 
governments of Helen Clark (1999–2008) 
engaged in the most restructuring in their 
earlier years, after Jennifer Shipley’s 
National-led government in the late 1990s, 
and before another reorganisational boom 
occurred during the first years of the 
National-led governments of John Key. 
This figure also illustrates the ‘seismic 
aftershock’ effect of the upheaval of 1986–
92: only 30% of the restructurings occurred 
in the years beforehand – that is, 1960–85 
– with 70% occurring afterwards, between 
1993 and 2017. As shown in Figure 8, 
outside the period 1986–92, Labour or 
Labour-led governments were significantly 
less likely to reduce the numbers of 
governmental agencies than were National 
or National-led governments, while both 
centre-left and centre-right governments 
were more or less equally inclined to create 
new agencies. 
When was restructuring most likely to occur 
and who – politicians and/or bureaucrats – 
impelled it?
Can the fact that there were markedly higher 
levels of organisational restructuring in 
the New Zealand state sector from 1993 
through to 2017 than in the 25 years 
prior to the changes introduced by the 
fourth Labour government be explained 
in part by the country’s adoption of the 
MMP electoral system from the mid-
1990s?                                                                                                                                       
While some organisational changes, 
including the establishment of new 
agencies, resulted from the politics of 
government formation, the data is 
inconclusive. There is some evidence, 
though weak, that government 
restructuring is more likely to occur in the 
first two or three years of a new 
government’s time in office: the third 
Labour government led by Norman Kirk 
generated markedly more cases after 
coming into office in 1972 than there had 
been during the preceding 12 years, and 
Muldoon’s government seems to have got 
most of its reorganisational energy out of 
its system in 1978 before leaving things 
largely intact. The National government of 
Jim Bolger was caught up in the reformist 
frenzy in its initial years, 1990–93, and after 
Bolger was deposed as prime minister by 
Jenny Shipley in 1997 there was, in the 
following year, another burst of intense 
reorganisation. A similar pattern is evident, 
on the face of it, in the first two or three 
years of the Clark-led governments, before 
another spurt occurred in the second term 
of office of John Key’s National-led 
government, 2011–14. 
Such a pattern, while not strongly 
pronounced, seems unexceptionable, as 
new governments might be expected to 
come into office with policies that they 
believe require organisational change for 
their implementation, and they may also 
have fresh notions about how the 
machinery of government as a whole can 
be better organised. On the other hand, it 
is possible that bureaucrats can most 
effectively promote their own reformist 
agendas during such times. 
Figure 8 shows that the National 
government led by Prime Minister Robert 
Muldoon was, of all administrations 
during the whole period covered by the 
study, markedly the least likely to engage 
in state sector organisational restructuring. 
By and large, Muldoon kept intact the 
machinery of government that he had 
inherited from his predecessors – having 
famously said that he wished to leave New 
Zealand no worse than it was when he took 
office. The commission for the Future, 
established during Muldoon’s time as 
prime minister, did not survive his growing 
political impatience with it. The 
commission was abolished, but not before 
it had predicted the advent of ultra-fast 
broadband, the internet, high-definition 
flatscreen TV sets and ‘pocket telephones’ 
(Morton, 2016). 
Organisational mortality
What in New Zealand has been the answer 
to Herbert Kaufman’s (1976) question: 
are government organisations immortal? 
Apparently not, although some have much 
longer life-spans than others. During the 
period studied, 55 organisations were 
abolished, of which five were ministries 
or departments, the rest being non-
departmental bodies, Crown entities or 
SOEs (including those that were privatised). 
Only five ministries or departments were 
done away with entirely – the Legislative 
Department, the Government Printing 
Office, the State Insurance Office, the 
Audit Department and the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority.
Discussion: why did restructuring become 
more frequent? 
These preliminary findings from Masashi 
Yui’s database raise a number of questions. 
Foremost among them is: why, after such 
an upheaval, has restructuring continued 
to occur so frequently, at a rate much 
higher than what had occurred before? 
Organisational restructuring in some shape 
or form will always be required, and cannot 
be regarded as a negative thing in and of 
itself, and ‘turf battles’ and the like have 
historically been as characteristic of New 
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Zealand government administration as 
elsewhere. Clearly, successive governments 
since the early 1990s have been addressing 
‘fragmentation’ and ‘siloisation’, in 
their efforts to re-establish ‘joined-up 
government’, a more strategically coherent 
state sector; all this in a much more 
complicated politico-administrative 
ecosystem than ever before, and when social 
and technological change demands that the 
machinery of government be constantly 
kept fit for purpose.
Major reorganisations, like the creation 
in 2013 of the large (by New Zealand 
standards) bureaucracy the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment, 
reflect this, and, as with this ministry, 
governments of different political stripes 
have continued to reshape the bureaucracy 
according to their own preferences and 
priorities: for example, the National-led 
government’s establishment of Work and 
Income New Zealand in the late 1990s, 
melding the former Employment Service 
and the income maintenance function of 
the then Department of Social Welfare; and 
the current Labour-led government’s 
creation of a Ministry of Housing and 
Urban Development, bringing together a 
number of functions previously carried out 
by several agencies. 
However, it may also be that 
managerialism tends to foster more 
managerialism, as more people are 
recruited to bureaucratic executive 
positions who tend to see ‘good 
management’ as a function, in the first 
instance at least, of ‘good’ organisational 
design, depending on their definition of 
‘good design’. It is also plausible that the 
end of the unified state sector career service 
in 1988, and its replacement with a 
position-based system, without the 
establishment of a unifying senior 
executive service, has seen the inculcation 
of a managerialist culture, in which 
structural reorganisation both within and 
among agencies is an instrument that can 
be used by executives and managers to 
expand or consolidate their own control 
and to advance their personal careers, in 
‘bureau-shaping’ behaviour (Dunleavy, 
1991; Norman and Gill, 2011). Also, 
organisational restructuring can be used 
to move people out of jobs, when 
employment laws may make this otherwise 
too difficult or costly. Or it may simply be 
a surrogate for genuine innovation 
designed to effectively achieve better policy 
outcomes.       
Strong criticisms of the New Zealand 
public service have recently been levelled 
at it by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, who, as 
deputy prime minister and then briefly 
prime minister in the fourth Labour 
government, was – ironically – one of the 
principal promoters of the radical changes 
of that time (Palmer and Butler, 2016). 
Palmer and Butler have called for a full 
royal commission of inquiry into the state 
services, which would be the first such 
inquiry since 1962 (although one was held 
in 1968 on wage-fixing procedures in the 
state services).9 In April 2018, in a speech 
at a function to mark the 30th anniversary 
of the State Sector Act 1988, Palmer 
summarised what he considered to be the 
main problems that need to be addressed. 
These include far too much ‘managerialism’, 
and ongoing problems of creating a public 
service with a sense of collective purpose, 
rather than it being a collection of 
separate fiefdoms. Only then, in Palmer’s 
view, will the quest for effective 
collaborative inter-agency action be 
effectively fulfilled. 
Both in his book with Andrew Butler 
and in his speech at the anniversary, Palmer 
strongly criticised the ‘endless restructuring’ 
that continues to characterise the New 
Zealand state sector. In doing so, he was 
echoing the sentiments expressed back in 
1998 by the then state services commissioner, 
who warned of the risks to productivity 
and staff morale generated by what he 
called a ‘restructuring culture’ (State 
Services Commission, 2013). Nearly 20 
years later, a New Zealand Productivity 
Commission draft report argued that state 
sector productivity was significantly lower 
than productivity in the corporate (or 
‘measured’) sector (Productivity 
Commission, 2017). And New Zealand’s 
overall productivity rates were well below 
those achieved in other countries, notably 
Australia. No data is available on state 
sector productivity in the decades before 
the radical changes of the 1980s and 90s, 
so it is not possible to demonstrate that 
productivity growth was in fact greater 
during that period than it has been since 
then. Nevertheless, the Productivity 
Commission report provides no evidence 
that state sector productivity overall was 
enhanced by the upheaval of the 1980s and 
90s, and we are left to speculate on how a 
different package of reforms might have 
improved productivity levels. The report 
does not explicitly identify excessive 
restructuring as one of the major problems 
with state sector productivity, and it says 
little or nothing about the impact of the 
radical changes on these productivity levels. 
However, if there is a negative 
correlation between the amount of 
organisational restructuring, on the one 
hand, and systemic productivity, on the 
other, then the data presented in this article 
would suggest that New Zealand’s state 
sector was probably more productive in 
the 20 years before the radical changes of 
the 1980s and 90s than it has been since 
then. Of course, it is not possible to draw 
this conclusion with any certainty, as there 
are many more factors that need to be 
taken into account. 
Conclusion
Whatever the case, it can be said with 
certainty that the ‘restructuring culture’ 
remains alive and well in the New Zealand 
state sector. How much of this has been 
driven internally by organisation chief 
executives and top management, and 
how much has resulted primarily from 
‘external’ factors is not clear. Further 
Whatever the case, it can be said with 
certainty that the ‘restructuring culture’ 
remains alive and well in the New 
Zealand state sector. 
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research is needed to try to trace the 
connections between the degree of 
organisational restructuring and such 
dimensions as public service motivation 
and morale, and to test hypotheses 
about its occurrence, and beyond that to 
determine the conditions under which it 
is an effective instrument in enhancing 
productivity and effectiveness, and when 
it is simply a manifestation of other, less 
laudable, motivations. Perhaps it is simply 
appropriate that in a seismically challenged 
country, where many aftershocks follow 
major earthquakes, the New Zealand state 
sector ‘landscape’ should find itself built 
on ever-shifting political and bureaucratic 
sands. 
1 This is an edited version of a paper prepared for the RC27 
Structure and Organization of Government panel, ‘Public 
Management Reform Models: flawed or the future?’, 
International Political Science Association, World Congress, 
Brisbane, 21–26 July 2018.
2 In New Zealand, the ‘core’ public service exists within 
the wider state sector. The latter comprises all central 
government agencies, together with several non-public 
service departments (e.g., the Defence Force and the Police). 
The ‘public sector’ refers to all agencies in both central and 
local government. 
3 The following types of organisation were omitted from 
analysis in this study: offices of Parliament; legislative branch 
departments; Crown entity subsidiaries, school boards of 
trustees, tertiary education institutions, organisations and 
companies on Public Finance Act schedules 4 and 4A, and 
mixed-ownership model companies.
4 An exception is inclusion of semi-autonomous bodies that 
operated more or less independently within their hosting 
ministries/departments. The semi-autonomous bodies were 
often converted into stand-alone departments/ministries or 
agencies, and vice versa.
5 The number is the total of distinct state sector organisations 
existing during the period of investigation. The following 
groups of Crown entities/agencies and non-departmental 
bodies were treated as single organisations: area health 
boards; business development boards; Crown health 
enterprises; Crown research institutes; district health boards; 
hospital and health services; regional health authorities.
6 The rules for counting structural reorganisations were as 
follows: (1) interconnected events of restructuring in the 
same policy areas constitute one change (e.g., the creation 
of the Department of Conservation, Ministry of Forestry, 
Department of Lands, Department of Survey and Land 
Information and two state-owned enterprises from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Ministry of Transport, 
Commission for the Environment, New Zealand Forest 
Service and Department of Internal Affairs); (2) despite rule 
(1), a series of restructuring events are counted as separate 
events when there was significant time lapse between 
previous and subsequent changes (e.g., preceding the 
transfer of functions of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, Land Information and the Ministry of Health, 
and its later disestablishment).
7 Crown entities do not include Crown entity subsidiaries, 
school boards of trustees, tertiary education institutions, 
and organisations and companies on Public Finance Act 
schedules 4 and 4A.  
8 In this study name change is purely about changing 
organisations’ names, which was not associated with any 
other type of restructuring implemented at the same time. 
For example, the name change of the Ministry of Works in 
1973 was not categorised as such because the ministry was 
replaced by the Ministry of Works and Development, taking 
over some functions from the Department of Labour.
9 Palmer and Butler have since published a revised, and 
retitled, version of the book, but retaining the original’s main 
arguments (Palmer and Butler, 2018).
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